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COLLECTIVE LABOR AGREEMENTS IN GERMAN LAW
BY RALPH F. FUCHS
The German law applicable to collective labor agreements be-
tween trade unions and employers displays an interesting adap-
tation of the law of contract to the needs of a system of thor-
oughgoing regulation. The jurisprudence which results is not
without its inconsistencies; yet its basic ideas are simple and ad-
mirably suited to the realities of modern industrial organization.
The government establishes certain minimum standards of em-
ployment by direct statutory enactment. Within these minima
the workers and employers are expected to establish further
standards by collective agreement. If they succeed partially the
aid of the government may be invoked to extend their control
within a limited area. If they do not succeed at all but one side
or the other is making efforts, the government may step in and
impose an "agreement" upon a trade or industry. Only where
strong efforts are not being made to bring about regulation by
collective agreement or where an agreement leaves open the door
to further bargaining, does the individual labor contract sig-
nify anything more than entry into a relation whose charac-
teristics are determined from without. Yet ideas of contract
law continue to influence the manner in which collective "agree-
ments" may be formed for the purpose of controlling individual
labor "contracts."
It is scarcely to be supposed that American industry, with its
millions of unorganized employees who display few signs of
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banding themselves into unions, will soon, if ever, come to accept
so comprehensive a system of regulation by governmental and
collective action as that which prevails in Germany. But trade
unionism in the United States is not dead, although it is far be-
low the peak of its strength, and collective agreements are still
numerous. Here and there developments in extensive sharing
of control by unions' rest upon a foundation of collective agree-
ments. It is likely, therefore, that the question of the legal posi-
tion of such agreements will continue to arise, perhaps with in-
creasing frequency. In dealing with that question German ex-
perience and German theory will aid, if only by way of sug-
gestion.
I. THE SYSTEM OF GERMAN LABOR LAW
The modern system of control of employment in Germany was
the immediate product of the revolution of 1918. Yet, as fre-
quently happens, the revolutionists built upon the familiar and
the useful in what had existed before; and the system which they
created has since been considerably altered. Its foundation is
the famous Ordinance of December 23, 1918.2 The Ordinance
has three parts. The Irst, dealing with collective agreements
and their possible extension by the Minister of Labor, is still in
effect. The second part, providing for a system of works coun-
cils, has since been superseded by the Works Councils Act of Feb-
ruary 4, 1920. 3 The third part, providing for conciliation of
labor disputes, has been superseded by the Conciliation Ordi-
nance of October 30, 1923. 4
'Such as those in the Chicago men's clothing market and in the shops of
the Baltimore and Ohio and other railroads.
IRGBI. (Reichsgesetzblatt) p. 1456. The Ordinance is known as the
Tarifvertragsordnung (TVO.) and was promulgated by the temporary
Council of People's Commissars. It was confirmed, along with Imperial
legislation and other ordinances of the Council, by an act of the Constituent
Assembly at Weimar, enacted Mar. 4, 1919, and by the general provision
of Art. 178 of the present Constitution. See Mattern, PRINCIPLES OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE GERMiAN NATIONAL REPUBLIC
(1928) 65-96, for an account of the transition from the old order to the new.3Betriebsraetegesetz (BRG.), RGBl. 147.
'Schlichtungsverordnung (SchIVO.), RGB. I, 1043. The fact that an
ordinance, as distinguished from a statute, was enacted to govern so im-
portant a matter, is accounted for partly by the broad ordinance-issuing
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Even the structure of control created by this relatively recent
legislation 5 is far from the ultimate which is envisaged by its
creators. The present German Constitution, which confers ju-
risdiction over employment upon the national government, con-
templates the enactment of a uniform labor law., Continuous
efforts to draft portions of such a law are being made.7  The
Works Councils Act is the first resulting product to receive stat-
utory enactment, but it is expected that ultimately an arbitration
act, a law governing collective agreements, and a law regulat-
ing individual labor contracts will be enacted. Meanwhile the
acts now in force are superimposed upon the labor contract sec-
tions of the Civil Code of 1896,8 the Commercial Code of 1897,1
and the Industrial Ordinance of 1869 as modified by the order of
July 26, 1900,10 all of which were drafted almost without refer-
ence to trade unions or collective agreements. The interpreta-
tion of collective agreements, except in so far as there are con-
trolling provisions in the Ordinance of December 23, 1918, is gov-
erned by the provisions of the Civil Code applicable to contracts
in general.
On the remedial side the situation has been greatly simplified
by the Labor Courts Act of December 23, 1926,12 which became
effective July 1, 1927. The Act establishes a complete system of
labor courts with comprehensive, exclusive jurisdiction in labor
cases. A National Labor Court, 2 closely linked with the Na-
power of the executive under the German Constitution (Art. 48 par. 2;
Arts. 50, 77), which can be stretched in emergencies. See Mattern, op. cit.,
ch. XI., for an account of this power. But the Arbitration Ordinance was
promulgated by authority of a special enabling act amounting to a con-
stitutional amendment, promulgated Oct. 13, 1923 (RGBL I, 943), to en-
able the government to deal with the crisis precipitated by extreme in-
flation and by the situation in the Ruhr.
' There are numerous acts in addition to the important ones already
cited.
'Art. 157.
'See Siefart, The Administration of Labor Law in Germany (1927) 15
INTEENATIONAL LABouR REviEw 681, 868, for an account of the present sys-
tem of labor law and of the contemplated improvements.fBuergerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB.) secs. 611-630.
Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB.) sees. 59-83.
RGBI. 871, secs. 105-139m.
Arbeitsgeriehtsgesetz (ArbGG.), RGBl. I, 507.
Reich8arbeitsgericht (RAG.).
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tional Court of Appeal," has appellate jurisdiction in all cases of
importance, so that a unified jurisprudence is likely to develop.
Prior to the establishment of the labor courts the civil courts,
with the Reichsgericht at their head, had jurisdiction of labor as
well as of other cases involving the Civil Code. But the great
bulk of labor cases arose in special industrial courts created by
the Act of July 29, 1890,14 and in commercial courts created by
the Act of July 6, 1904,'r for neither of which was a system of ap-
peals established. In addition the decisions of conciliators and
conciliation commissions are regarded as administrative acts,
subject only to very limited review in the ordinary courts. For
review of administrative acts there are in many instances admin-
istrative "courts," some of whose decisions are reported; but
as yet there is no unified system and no central court of appeal
such as is called for by the Constitution.16 Finally there are
penalty provisions in various of the labor statutes, whose en-
forcement is had in criminal proceedings, reported separately
from civil cases.
In theory there is developing out of these statutes and deci-
sions, conflicting and uncertain though they be,17 a body of law
known as Labor Law, a major branch of jurisprudence. In ac-
cordance with the manifest intent of the revolution as expressed
in the German Constitution, that law is taking its place beside
the Civil Law, Criminal Law, Commercial Law, Public Law, and
perhaps other divisions of law, as an integral part of a modern
system of control. Whether ultimately collective agreements will
be its most fundamental feature cannot be foretold. At pres-
Reichsgericht (RG.)
" Gewerbgerichtgesetz, amended by decree of Sep. 29, 1901, RGBI. 353.
Kaufmannsgerichtsgesetz, RGBI 266.
'Art. 108. For an account of the German administrative courts see
Blachly & Oatman, THE GOVERNMENT AND ADImINISTRATION or GERMANY
(Institute for Government Research Study in Administration, 1928), ch.
XIV.
" The uncertainty of much of this law causes a feeling of considerable
discomfort to many German lawyers, accustomed as they are to a system of
codes. Thus the importance of simplification is stressed at the outset in
the able work of Hueck & Nipperdey, LEHRBUCH DES ARBEITSRECHTS (Mann-
heim: J. Bensheimer, 1928) v. I, 22-23. "If the parties," say the authors,
"lose their perception of the laws applicable to them, the laws become un-
workable."
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ent, however, they are the basis upon which the system is being
constructed. It is the purpose of this paper to examine the pres-
ent legal position of these agreements.1 8
H. COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS AND FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
Some of the main lines of judicial thought with reference to
collective labor agreements, with contract law as their founda-
tion, were laid down prior to the Great War. The decision in
the first and leading case in the Reichsgericht was rendered on
January 20, 1910.19 The plaintiff was an employers' association
which had entered into a collective agreement with a branch of
the German Woodworkers' Union. The object of the suit was
to recover the damage caused to the plaintiff and to thirteen of
its members who had assigned their claims to it, growing out of
a strike of the branch union in alleged violation of the agree-
ment. The branch in question, its principal officer N., and the
national union were made defendants. The trouble arose when
many of the workers in the plants of the thirteen members of
the employers' association remained away from work in order to
celebrate May Day, 1906. The employers countered with a
three-day suspension of the offenders from work. The workers
seized the occasion to demand a wage increase of five pfennigs
an hour, refusing to return to work until it should be granted.
At a meeting of the branch union, presided over by defendant
N., it was resolved to support the strikers by every means pos-
sible, including the payment of strike benefits. The strike ac-
tually was carried on for some time. In its decision the Reichs-
gericht decided the following points: (1) there was a valid col-
lective agreement between the plaintiff employers' association
and the defendant branch union; (2) the defendant national
ITo obtain a complete picture of the courts' dealings with collective
agreements it would be necessary to examine the reports of all of the courts,
civil, criminal, administrative, industrial, and commercial, at least since-
1910. No attempt has been made to do so in the preparation of this paper.
Attention has been confined to the decisions of the Reichsgericht in labor
cases and to the decisions of the Reichsarbeitsgericht which are reported in
the National Labor Gazette (Reichsarbeitsblatt-RABl.) through June,.
1929. Examination of the decisions of the Reichsgeiicht was rendered much
easier by their exhaustive treatment in two volumes by Dersch, Flatow,
Hueck & Nipperdey, Diz ENTSPRECHUNG DES REICHSGERICHTS ZUM ARBEITS-
RECHT (Mannheim: J. Bensheimer, 1927, 1929).
78 RGZ. (Ent8cheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen) 92.
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union, having had nothing to do with either the agreement or the
strike, could not be liable; (3) since the agreement said nothing
about May Day as a holiday and did not attempt to limit disci-
plinary measures, neither the action of the workers in remaining
away from work on May Day nor the action of the employers in
suspending them was in violation of the agreement; (4) while
there was nothing in the agreement to prevent a worker from at-
tempting by individual contract to secure higher wages than
those specified in the agreement, a strike in furtherance of an ef-
fort to raise wages was a clear violation of the agreement; (5)
although the thirteen employers were not themselves parties to
the agreement it was made for their benefit and causes of action
in favor of each of them arose out of its breach,20 which it was
competent for them to assign to the plaintiff; and (6) both the
branch union and N., who entered into the agreement on its be-
half, were liable for the damage suffered by the plaintiff and its
thirteen members. 21
The conception of collective agreements which this decision
announces leaves individual freedom of contract, legally speak-
ing, unimpaired. Such an agreement does not necessarily fix the
terms of any individual contract of employment unless one of the
parties is individually a party to the agreement and has bound
himself to abide by its terms. Where a union and an employers'
I By virtue of BGB. see. 328, which reads as follows (Wang's transla-
tion): "An act of performance in favor of a third party may by contract
be stipulated for in such a manner that the third party acquires a direct
right to the performance.
"In the absence of express stipulation it is to be inferred from the cir-
cumstances, especially from the object of the contract, whether the third
party shall acquire the right .... "
I N. was liable because the branch union had not registered under BGB.
sec. 21 so as to acquire "juristic personality." BGB. sec. 54 provides that
"If a member of such an association (which lacks juristic personality], act-
ing in the name of the association, enters into a juristic act with a third
party, that member is personally liable; if several members so act, they
are liable as joint debtors." The union itself, although lacking "juristic
-ersonality," was suable under an express provision of the Code of Civil
:Procedure (Zivilprozessordnug-ZPO.) see. 50 and was subject to have
execution levied upon its funds by virtue of sec. 735 of the same enact-
ment. Its members might have been held liable as partners (BGB. sec.
.54) ; but to enforce that liability it would have been necessary for the
plaintiff to proceed against them as individuals (ZPO., Sydow's 18th ed.,
.anno. to see. 736).
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association make the agreement, it is simply a pact between two
organizations in which these organizations promise each other
to do their best to bring about and maintain a certain state of af-
fairs.21 For breach of that promise they are liable to each other
and to each others' members for whose benefit the promise is
made; but no duty and no liability of any sort attach to the mem-
bers of the union or of the employers' association. 28  It will be
seen that under this view the ultimate power which enforces such
agreements in theory as well as in fact is the economic and
moral pressure which can be brought to bear upon individual
workers and employers. The legal sanction operates only, so
far as that is possible, to compel the organizations to exert pres-
sure for the objectives laid down in the agreement. 24
Into this pre-war legal situation the Ordinance of December
23, 1918, injected a new idea which all but destroys individual,
freedom of contract in the presence of a collective agreement..
Says the Ordinance :25
If the conditions for the conclusion of labor contracts are
regulated by a written collective agreement between organi-
' Two decisions of the Reichsgericht, handed down Oct. 21, 1912, and
briefly reported in DAS RECHT 1913, cases no. 154 & 155, state specifically
that collective agreements bind the organizations which enter into them
but do not bind the members of those organizations. In neither case are the,
facts reported. In a decision handed down Oct. 13, 1911, reported in
JURrSTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1911, p. 1014, the Reichsgericht held that a
union did not by entering into a collective agreement guarantee that its-
members would not be guilty of violations. The union promises to use its.
best efforts to secure adherence to the terms of the agreement, but no
more. Liability in damages because of an unauthorized strike was held
not to attach to the union in that case, inasmuch as it had done nothing to,
bring about or to further the strike.
Whether a court should enforce a collective agreement at the suit of
individual workers or employers who themselves have refused to follow
it is a question which does not seem to have arisen.
"Where an employer individually enters into a collective agreement the
possibility of legal enforcement is greater, as stated above. For then if'
the employer fails to abide by the terms of employment laid down in the
agreement he is answerable. But such agreements are relatively unim-
portant. At the end of 1916, when they were quantitatively at their height,
they applied to 22.3 per cent. of the establishments and 36.5 per cent. of the
workers covered by agreements. On Jan. 1, 1927, the corresponding figures
were 0.8 per cent. and 3.7 per cent. See table in SONDERHEFT 43 to RABI.,
DIE TAIUFVERTAEGE IN DEUTSCHEN REICHE AM 1 JANUAR., 1927, p. 8.
"Sec. 1.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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zations of workers and single employers or associations of
employers, labor contracts between affected parties shall be
invalid in so far as they depart from the provisions of the
collective agreement. Contracts constituting departures
shall nevertheless be valid if they are definitely permitted
by the collective agreement or if they involve an alteration
in the terms of employment which is favorable to the work-
ers and are not definitely forbidden. The corresponding
provisions of the collective agreement shall replace invalid
[individual] contracts.
Affected parties within the meaning of paragraph 1 are
employers and workers who are parties to the collective
agreement, who are or were at the time of the conclusion of
the agreement members of organizations which formed the
agreement, or who have made their [individual] labor
contracts with reference to the collective agreement.
In other words, a collective agreement may now lay down
terms and conditions of employment which shall exclude other
terms and conditions that have been or may be fixed by individ-
ual bargaining, except where the latter are more favorable to
employees and are not expressly forbidden in the agreement.
The terms and conditions established by collective bargaining
are, with the exception named, the only ones which a court will
enforce in a suit between a worker and an employer. Indi-
vidual freedom of contract disappears in the face of legislative
power which the state delegates to economic organizations or
recognizes as existing in them. Freedom of individual contract
continues to prevail only as between employers and workers who
are not affected by collective agreements.
To remain unaffected by a collective agreement, however, fre-
quently is all but impossible. For:
The National Ministry of Labor may declare generally
binding such collective agreements as have acquired out-
standing importance in the fixing of terms of employment
of certain occupations in the areas covered by the agree-
ments. Within their geographical scope they shall there-
upon be valid as to labor contracts for work which comes
under the collective agreements and shall be binding as pro-
vided in section I even though the employer or employee or
both are not directly affected by the agreement.
-0
" TVO. sec. 2. Sec. 3 provides that "The declaration provided for in sec-
tion 2 shall follow upon a proposal. Parties to the collective agreement and
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol15/iss1/1
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Nor is there entire freedom of contract as between organiza-
tions of workers and of employers. For when a labor dispute
becomes a subject of conciliation proceedings an "agreement"
may be imposed, the terms of which one side or both sides may
have been unwilling to accept voluntarily. In the Conciliation
Ordinance it is provided that conciliators shall use all possible
means to bring the parties to an industrial dispute into agree-
ment. Failing in that, the final conciliation board is directed to
issue a decree which shall constitute a proposal to the parties.2
7
If it is accepted by both sides it becomes an agreement. The
Ordinance then provides:
If the decree is not accepted by the parties, it can be de-
clared binding. .
The declaration of binding effect takes the place of accept-
ance of the decree. 28
Thus, where an "agreement" is imposed in this manner of-
fer and acceptance both emanate from official sources.
A collective agreement really contains two kinds of provisions.
There are, first, the terms of employment which the agreement
in quasi-legislative fashion introduces into the individual. labor
contracts of affected parties. These are known as "normative"
provisions. In addition there are the terms by which the parties
to the agreement confer rights and duties upon themselves,
known as "obligatory" provisions. The latter are contractual in
nature and were recognized and enforced by the Reichsgericht
in the decision of January 20, 1910, outlined above. The for-
mer, in the absence of legal representation of their members by
unions and employers' associations, 2 could not be made legally
binding until the Ordinance of December 23, 1918, gave them a
force which the courts would recognize. Prior to that time there
organizations of employers or workers whose members would be affected by
the ministry's declaration are entitled to make such a proposal."
SohlVO. sec. 5.
Id. sec. 6.
The agency theory has not been seriously considered in actual decisions
in Germany. It was, however, rejected by the Reichsgericht in a decision
on Nov. 27, 1925, RABL. 1926, 110, JUPISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 1927, 241.
Most writers reject it as untenable. See Nipperdey in Dersch, Flatow, etc.,
op. cit. n. 18 above, I, 74-76.
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was no recognized legal category into which such privately es-
tablished norms seemed to fall. 0
It is the normative provisions of an existing collective agree-
ment, and only those, which the Minister of Labor extends to
non-members of the contracting organizations when he exercises
the power conferred upon him by section 2 of the Ordinance.
He has no power to extend the obligatory provisions of any
agreement to organizations which have not bound themselves.
The "agreements" which are imposed in conciliation proceed-
ings, on the other hand, consists of both "normative and "obliga-
tory" provisions and are binding alike upon individual employ-
ers and workers and upon unions and employers' associations.
It is here that state control fully replaces private action. There
is, in effect, compulsory arbitration coupled with compulsory ac-
ceptance of decisions.
Ill. THE OPERATION OF THE LAW OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS
A review of the cases will serve to bring out various significant
aspects of the law of collective labor agreements in Germany.
A. The Duty to Preserve Industrial Peace
Practically every collective agreement imposes the obligatory
duty, which may be express or implied, to preserve industrial
peace as to matters included in the agreement. "Collective
agreements," said the Oberlandesgericht of Saxony in a recent
case, 31 ". . . . have the result of introducing civil law ob-
ligations between the parties, in which the obligation to keep the
peace is included. This duty arises of itself from every collec-
tive agreement without express stipulation. For 'It is so closely
bound up with the nature of a collective agreement that without
it the attainment of the legal and economic purposes which are
A great deal of philosophical speculation is possible as to the nature of
the obligation, if any, which a collective agreement imposes upon the indi-
viduals whom it purports to govern. It has been argued that the obligation
arises out of a "community of interest" which the courts should recognize
even when the legislature does not require them to do so. Perhaps the best
brief discussion in English is contained in an article by M. Leon DuGuit,
Collective Acts as Distinguished from Contracts (trans. Lorenzen, 1918) 27
YAIE L. J. 753.
t RABl. 1927, 66 (Jan. 12, 1927).
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to be served by the conclusion of the agreement would be greatly
jeopardized. Collective agreements are designed not only to
establish conditions of work but also to further the possibility of
making these effective.' . ."
In the case itself the day shift in the plaintiff's coal mine re-
fused on May 5, 1924, to work for the lengthened hours which
were imposed in a conciliation decree. The men were summarily
discharged, whereupon their fellows struck spontaneously. The
defendant union, to which the miners belonged and to which the
conciliation decree applied, assumed charge of the strike and
conducted it. The court held that the union was liable to the
plaintiff in damages. The plaintiff also sued the officers of the
union because of their part in conducting the strike. The court,
however, pointed out that the obligatory portion of a collective
agreement32 does not apply to individuals merely because they
are members and officers of organizations which are parties to
the agreement. The individual defendants therefore violated
no duty to the plaintiff. A suggestion that the officers might be
liable in tort for acting contra bonos mores3 was rejected, since
they were acting in good faith in a situation of great difficulty.'
4
The facts in a case decided by the Reichsgericht on June 9,
1925,8 were not dissimilar, except that there the obligation to
keep the peace was expressed in the agreement and was broader
than an implied obligation would have been. Monthly adjust-
ments of pay were provided for in the agreement and it was
further stipulated that all disputes were to be submitted to con-
ciliation. Strikes and lockouts were forbidden. The question
of the wage scale for April, 1922, was submitted to conciliation,
but the workers refused to accept the award. On April 8 they
concertedly loafed on the job, whereupon the plaintiff closed its
plant until it should receive assurances that the sabotage would
not be resumed. A strike followed, which the defendant union
conducted. The union was held liable in damages, not because
" That is, in this case, of the decree establishing the lengthened hours.
"BGB. sec. 826 makes such conduct actionable.
" The same point was decided by the Reichsgericht on Dec. 20, 1927, 119
RGZ. 291.
"ill RGZ. 105.
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of the sabotage, for which it was not responsible, but for its con-
duct of the subsequent strike 5
In a third case of like nature, the facts of which are not re-
ported, 7 the Reichsgericht held both the union which was party
to the collective agreement and its leader liable for the damages
growing out of a strike in violation of the agreement. Again
the agreement was one which had been imposed. By giving
judgment against the leader of the union as well as against the
union itself the court, stretching the statutory theory, applied the
doctrines of contract law to a situation from which all elements
of contract had departed. The statute" expressly states that
the declaration of binding effect whereby a conciliation decree is
imposed shall take the place of an acceptance by the parties.
Another statute89 provides that one who makes a contract on be-
half of an unregistered association shall be personally liable up-
on the contract. The union in this case was unregistered and
was represented in the conciliation proceedings by its leader.
The court argued that by force of the first statute the imposition
of the conciliation decree was substituted not only for the ac-
ceptance of an agreement by the union but for an acceptance
through this specific leader. That being so, the leader's liability
followed from the provision of the second statute. Said the
Court:
The meeting of minds which has been brought about in
this manner-albeit as a result of compulsion-must, if it is
to have full effect, produce the same results according to the
civil law of contract as a contract which has been freely en-
tered into.40
" Nipperdey (Dersch, Flatow, etc.), op. cit. n. 18 above, 58 et seq. makes
the point that the agreement did not provide for compulsory acceptance of
conciliation awards and that therefore the supposed strike was not a strike
but a justifiable remaining away from work for which no wages had been
established. Apparently, however, the court assumed that the agreement,
in view of its prohibition of strikes, did intend that the awards should be
binding. Its interpretation was reasonable if not inevitable.87RAB1. 1927, 363, JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1927, 2363 (May 25,
1927).
Sch1VO. sec. 6, above.
BGB, sec. 54, quoted n. 21 above.
,Kaskel, in a note appended to the report of the case in the JUnISTiScHE
WOCnuNSCHRI, criticises the decision, not upon the ground that contract
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol15/iss1/1
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The implied obligation to preserve industrial peace which
arises out of a collective agreement extends no farther than the
ground covered by the agreement.4 1 Thus in a case decided on
January 29, 1915,42 a longshoremen's union, notwithstanding a
collective agreement between it and the plaintiff, fostered a
strike of its members in sympathy with certain striking deck
hands. The Reichsgericht held that this act of the union could
not be made the basis of a suit for damages, since the union was
not seeking to undermine the regulations established by the col-
lective agreement. Similarly in a case decided on June 30,
1926,41 it was held not to be in violation of a collective agreement
for a union to foster tactics amounting to a strike when the pur-
pose was to secure higher wages, a scale for the month not hav-
ing been fixed in accordance with the agreement.
B. The Obligation to Participate in Setting Up Conciliation
Machinery
Where a collective agreement provides for the establishment
of joint machinery for the settlement of disputes, there is a duty
cast upon the organizations which formed the agreement to play
the parts assigned to them in setting up that machinery. In a
case decided November 30, 1923, 44 the Reichsgericht denied, how-
ever, that the duty was one which was enforcible by civil action.
The suit was brought in a civil court by an employers' associa-
tion against a union upon a collective agreement which provided
that there should be a central joint board made up of three mem-
bers selected by the employers and three by the union. Two of
the latter were to be named by the defendant and one by the na-
law is inapplicable, but upon the ground that there was no evidence that
the union's final acceptance of the award, if it had been accepted, would
necessarily have come through the leader who represented it in the con-
ciliation proceedings, and upon the further ground that the Court failed to
note that the imposition of the agreement did not, according to the language
of the statute, represent an acceptance by the union's agent or anyone else
but was, instead, substituted for the acceptance.
4 An express obligation may, of course, be included in the agreement and
may be made as absolute as the parties desire. See the decision in 111
RGZ. 105, discussed above.
"486 RGZ. 152.
RABL 1926, 197.
"107 RGZ. 247.
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tional union of which defendant was a part. The purpose of the
suit was to compel the defendant to name its member in order
that they might sit in a proceeding instituted by the plaintiff.
The Reichsgericht refused relief, stating in broad terms that
joint conciliation or arbitration boards, although set up by agree-
ments which are civil contracts, partake of the public adminis-
trative character of statutory conciliation boards, since they take
the place of those boards in cases arising out of the agreements. 4"
Accordingly the remedy, if any, for the defendant union's refusal
to play its part in setting up the joint board was deemed to lie
with the public administrative authorities.
The decision was a reasonable one in view of a statutory pro-
vision which the court does not cite; for section 21 of the Ordi-
nance of December 23, 1918, provided that if a joint board, es-
tablished by agreement, was available to decide a case, the statu-
tory conciliation or mediation board should urge the parties to
invoke its aid and "in the event that this nevertheless is not ac-
complished or does not lead to a proceeding, shall itself institute
mediation proceedings." A clear administrative remedy thus
was made available. Criticism of the decision in which Dr.
Nipperdey indulges" seems hardly justified, although much of
the court's language is open to objection. Dr. Nipperdey seems
clearly right in urging that an arbitration clause in a collective
agreement is analogous to any other civil contract to arbitrate.
The Reichsgericht was not called upon to go out of its way, as
it did, to deny that there was any such similarity. But in the
matter of the remedy available to the plaintiff, which was the
only real issue in the case, the court did not need to resort to the
statutes applicable to ordinary contracts to arbitrate.47 It did
"TVO. sec. 20 was in force at the time the case arose. It provides in
par. 2 that "In case of disputes over which special mediation or conciliation
boards have jurisdiction by virtue of collective agreements or other com-
pacts, such boards shall be summoned, and only when these fail to function
shall the regular conciliation or mediation boards assume charge." The
same principle has now been incorporated in ArbGG. secs. 91 & 105 and,
though less clearly, in SchIVO. secs. 3 & 4.
1 Dersch, Flatow, etc., op. cit. n. 18 above, I, 87 et seq.
"Such contracts are governed by ZPO. secs. 1025-1048. In sec. 1029 it
is provided that a civil court sliall name an arbitrator to represent any
party to such a contract who fails to carry out his contract obligation to
name an arbitrator himself.
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not deny that there was an obligation resting upon the defendant
union, arising out of the agreement, to name its two arbitrators.
If the statutory remedy for its failure to abide by that obligation
was inadequate, the fault is hardly the court's.
C. The Operation of Extended and Imposed Agreements
It is stated above that extensions of agreements, declared by
the Minister of Labor in accordance with section 2 of the Ordi-
nance of December 23, 1918, cannot operate to extend the obli-
gatory provisions of such agreements. This point is emphasized
in a recent decision of the Reichsarbeitsgericht.8 The book
printers' union had an agreement with the German book print-
ers' association which provided that none but journeymen print-
ers should be employed as operators upon certain kinds of ma-
chines. The agreement was extended to apply to the defendant,
a printer who was not a member of the association. He had
been employing a woman who was not a journeyman printer up-
on a machine in his shop, and he continued to do so. The union
brought suit to contest his right to employ the woman in this
kind of work. The court held that the action must fail for two
reasons. The first was that the provision in question was obliga-
tory and not normative and hence could not under the statute be
extended in its operation by the Minister of Labor so as to apply
to the defendant. The provision was a prohibition of the em-
ployment of certain workers and hence could not, like provisions
affecting wages and hours, become an implied term in individual
employment contracts. The second reason was that the provi-
sion in question did not bind even those employers and workers
who were members of the organizations which formed the agree-
ment. Its sole effect was to bind the organizations on each side
to see to it so far as they could that their members adhered to the
provision.
By way of contrast, a decision of the Reichsgericht, handed
down June 30, 1925,49 enforced an obligatory clause in a collec-
tive agreement where the agreement had been imposed in con-
ciliation proceedings. The case was one of the many which arose
out of the period of inflation when frequent adjustment of wages
RABl. 1928, 276 (Oct. 10, 1928).
111 RGZ. 166.
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was necessary to keep pace with the falling mark. An agree-
ment in the lignite mining industry, concluded March 24, 1922,
provided for weekly adjustments of wages. Some of the miners
refused to accept the scale established for the week of October
15-22, 1923, and walked out. They were summarily discharged.
After various efforts to establish peace had failed, a special con-
ciliation commission made an award which the Minister of Labor
imposed upon the industry." It provided that work should be
resumed November 2 and that all miners who had been dis-
charged as a result of the strike should be reinstated. The suit
was brought by the employers' association against several unions
of miners to establish the point that the reinstatement clause
bound neither the association nor its members. The court con-
ceded that the plaintiff's members were not legally bound, since
the clause belonged to the obligatory portion of the imposed
agreement, which could not be enforced against members of
either the operators' association or the union. The court, how-
ever, rejected the contention that the association itself was not
bound. It was obligated, said the court, to do all it could to se-
cure the reinstatement of the men. The court pointed out that
the conciliation statutes would be futile if they were construed to
make it possible to settle only those disputes which relate to the
terms and conditions of employment. The statutes were intend-
ed to extend also to disputes 5' over such matters as reinstatement,
and the power of the Minister of Labor to declare awards to be
binding was made equally broad, so as to enable him to impose
obligatory as well as normative provisions. Said the court:
An identification of the imposition of decrees with the ex-
tension of collective agreements under section 2 of the Col-
lective Agreement Ordinance must be rejected. The pur-
pose which the latter serves is entirely different from the
end sought to be reached by the former. The extension of
agreements seeks exclusively the equalization of conditions
of employment and is intended to prevent injury to organ-
ized workers through underbidding by the unorganized. It
'Although the SchIVO. of Oct. 30, 1923, was not yet in force (see sec. 6,
quoted above), certain laws supplementary to the Ordinance of Dec. 23,
1918, conferred upon the Minister of Labor the power to impose decrees
which he exercised in this case.
" Gesamtstreitigkeiten--"collective disputes."
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has to do, consequently, only with the normative portion of
collective agreements. The imposition of a decree of a con-
ciliation board, on the other hand, serves the purpose of re-
storing industrial peace equally in the interest of employers
and workers and in that of the community-a purpose which
usually can be attained only by means of the assumption by
the parties to the resulting agreement of obligatory duties,
including resumption of work and reinstatement.
If the plaintiff fails to admonish its members to abide by
the decree . . . or to proceed against recalcitrant and
disobedient members with constitutional means of punish-
ment and of exerting pressure, or if the plaintiff openly or
convertly fosters opposition to the imposed agreement, the
defendant can . . . sue it in damages upon its con-
tractual obligation. A similar right to sue vests also in the
individual members of the defendants against the plaintiff.
D. The Operation of Normative Provisions
The normative portions of a collective agreement are legally
enforcible as terms of individual contracts of employment. "By
the alteration of an existing collective agreement or by the con-
clusion of a new one the new norms automatically enter into all
the individual contracts of employment."' 2 The individual con-
tracts themselves, however, are not and cannot be formed by the
collective agreement. Entry into the employment relation is
legally a matter of choice, whatever may be the economic actual-
ity. That much individual freedom of contract remains. Hence
the normative provisions of collective agreements must, so to
speak, be invoked before they become completely effective.
The situation in this respect is interestingly set forth in a de-
'Oberlandesgericht of Saxony, RABi. 1927, 66. That the inclusion of
the terms of employment fixed by a collective agreement in the individual
contracts of employment is automatic and is not dependent upon the will
of the parties is illustrated by a decision of the Reichsarbeitsgericht ren-
dered Dec. 8, 1928. RABI. 1929, 52. The suit was for wages according to
the scale laid down in a collective agreement. The plaintiff at the time of
the hiring had concealed from the defendant the fact that he was a mem-
ber of the union which had formed the agreement, and he agreed to ac-
cept a lower wage. The defendant did not come under the agreement. It
was held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover, since the Ordinance of
Dec. 23, 1918, gave him a right to the scale laid down in the collective
agreement. Even his bad faith did not deprive him of this right.
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cision of the Reichsarbeitsgericht handed down June 26, 1929. 3
In the course of a dispute between a trade union and an employ-
er, defendant in the case, 86 workers gave the two-weeks' notice
required by their contracts of employment, that they would quit
on May 24, 1928. On May 26 a conciliation decree was imposed,
which provided that these notices of termination of service
should be regarded as withdrawn. May 27 and 28 were holidays
and on May 29 the 86 workers presented themselves for work.
They were turned away, but on May 31 the defendant reinstated
83 of them. It refused to re-employ the other three. Those who
were reinstated, however, were not paid for May 29 and 30.
They brought this action to recover their wages for these two
days and were joined by the other three men, who sued for rein-
statement and for back pay. The court pointed out that the
decree, or "agreement," could not withdraw the notices of quit-
ting which the 86 men had given. They alone could do that. In
this case the notices had taken effect. Neither was it competent
for a decree to reinstate men whose employment relation had
been severed. All the decree could do, and all that it should be
interpreted as having attempted to do, was to lay it down as a
normative term, to be incorporated into the individual labor con-
tracts whereby these men might be re-employed, that they were
to be deemed as continuing in their former employment. In the
case of the 83 who were reinstated this normative term became
operative. Accordingly, these men were held to be entitled to
the wages for which they sued. In the case of the other three,
however, there was no contract of re-employment upon which the
provision of the decree, or "agreement," could operate. These
men terminated their own employment. No obligation rested
upon the defendant to take them back. Accordingly it was held
that they could not recover.
A similar situation, with the parties reversed, was dealt with
in an earlier decision of the Reichsgericht 4 A textile manufac-
turer sued a trade union for damages growing out of a strike in
alleged violation of a collective agreement. The wage scale was
fixed in a subsidiary agreement, which expired on October 1,
RABl. 1929, 70.
"118 RGZ. 196 (Oct. 14, 1927).
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1925. Attempts to establish a new scale failed, and a large num-
ber of workers gave the required one-day notice and left theplain-
tiff's employ. On November 2 a conciliation decree was declared
binding, which established a scale. The men, however, did not
return to work until November 26. The union was held not
liable. It was clearly proper for the men to refuse to work in the
absence of a recognized scale of wages. And since they termi-
nated their employment there was no relationship between them
and the plaintiff upon which the new scale could operate after
November 2. Nor, said the Court, was the union obligated to
urge its members to return to an employment they had left.55
The extension by the Minister of Labor of the normative provi-
sions of a collective agreement may at times impose rather far-
reaching innovations upon a trade or industry in the guise of
normative provisions. Thus in the drug trade a collective agree-
ment established a pension fund and provided that the employer
should withhold a specified amount from the pay of each em-
ployee, add to it a like amount contributed by himself, and turn
over the whole to the fund. The agreement was extended by the
Minister of Labor. Two employers, who were bound by the
agreement only by reason of its extension, resisted conforming
to the pension scheme. In a suit against them by the union and
the employers' association, which had established the pension
fund as partners, it was held by the Reichsarbeitsgericht-5 that
the defendants must make the prescribed deductions and pay-
ments. The pension provisions of the collective agreement, like
the ordinary wage provisions, became incorporated into the in-
dividual contracts of employment of all those subject to the
agreement.
The defendants had stipulated expressly in their contracts
with their employees that the pension scheme was to form no
part of their understanding. In the suit they sought to estab-
lish the defense that this departure from the terms of the collec-
I The Court's decision on this point was obviously quite technical.
Granted that there was no continuing employment relation to which the
new wage scale could attach and that there was no obligation upon the part
of the men to return, it was still possible to say that the union was obli-
gated to do all it could to terminate what in effect was a strike.
f RABl. 1929, 18 (Oct. 27, 1928).
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tive agreement, since it did away with deductions from the em-
ployees' pay, was to the advantage of the employees and hence
was an allowable departure from the terms of the collective
agreement under section 1 of the Ordinance of December 23,
1918. The Court had no difficulty in reaching an opposite con-
clusion. The question of whether a departure from the norma-
tive terms of a collective agreement is to the advantage or to the
disadvantage of the workers is one which has been litigated a
number of times. The courts usually have taken a common-
sense attitude in reaching their decisions, assuming that what is
ordinarily considered to be favorable or unfavorable to the work-
ers actually is so.5 7
The Reichsgericht has uttered the obiter dictum that the nor-
mative provisions of a collective agreement continue to have a
certain force after the agreement itself has expired.r' The Court
said:
If the normative provisions [of the collective agreement]
have become incorporated into the individual contracts of
employment, the agreement remains in force as to these un-
til a new agreement has gone into effect or until the parties
to the individual contracts of employment have agreed upon
different terms.
What the Court obviously means is not that the quasi-legisla-
tive force of the agreement lives on, but that the individual con-
tracts of employment continue in force and that the terms orig-
inally introduced into them by the collective agreement remain
until they are changed. This view appears entirely reasonable.'0
"In RABl. 1926, 110; JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 1927, 241 (Nov. 27,
1925), below, the Reichsgericht rejected the contention that a lengthening
of hours with added pay was a departure from the terms of a collective
agreement favorable to the workers. In RABI. 1928, 177 (Jan. 4, 1928)
the Reichsa rbeitsgeric t denied that a contract for less than the wages
fixed in a collective agreement, even when it was accepted by the employee
as the only alternative to no job at all, could be regarded as a favorable
departure.
114 RGZ. 194 (July 2, 1926). The decision in the case was to the ef-
fect that the power of a joint board to decide a dispute over the discharge
of a worker ceased with the expiration of the agreement under which the
board was established, there being no provision in the agreement to pre-
serve the existence of the board for a longer time.
Nipperdey, however, criticises it severely (Dersch, Flatow, etc., op cit.
n. 18 above, II, pp. 55-58). He denies that the normative provisions of a
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E. The Anomaly of Retroactive Operation
Occasionally a collective agreement provides for retroactive
increases in the pay of workers. The question has arisen wheth-
er such increases can be enforced by workers who no longer are
in the service of their employer, as respects the period between
the effective date of the increase in pay and the date their em-
ployment ended. In theory the answer would be in the nega-
tive; for at the time the collective agreement goes into effect there
no longer are individual contracts of employment involving these
workers, into which the normative obligation to pay back wages
can be introduced. Yet both the Reichsgericht0 and the Reichs-
arbeitsgerichtV1 have in broad terms decided the question in the
affirmative--assuming in each particular case, of course, that it
was the intention of those who framed the collective agreement to
have the increase apply to workers who had left the service of
their employers. If the holding had been limited to cases in
which the possibility of retroactive increases in pay was foresee-
able, as it might have been, for example, during the period of in-
flation, so that a provision for subsequent payment might be
deemed to have been incorporated into the original individual
contracts of employment, 2 it would be theoretically defensible.
As it is, the decisions represent a victory of fairness and of prac-
ticality over formal legal logic.
F. Waiver of Normative Provisions
It seems to have become established as the result of an obiter
dictum of the Reichsgericht in a decision handed down November
27, 1925,63 that individual workers, who cannot contract for
collective agreement theoretically enter into the individual contracts of em-
ployment. He thinks, rather, that they constitute extra-contractual stand-
ards which there is nothing to maintain after their quasi-legislative force
is lost. His view on this point is heterodox.
1 NAZiONALZEIzTNG FUR ARBExIT, 1924, 496 (Dec. 11, 1923), discussed in
Derach, Flatow, etc., op. cit. n. 18 above, I, 41 et seq.
RABL. 1929, 119 (Feb. 23, 1929).
"This actually was the situation in the earlier of the two cases, but the
court did not rely upon that fact in reaching its decision.
0 RABL. 1926, 110; JURISTISCHE VOCHENSCHRIFP, 1927, 241. The Reich-
sarbeitageriht took the same position in an obiter dictum in a case de-
cided Jan. 4, 1928 (RABI. 1928, 177).
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lower wages than those specified in a collective agreement, may
nevertheless waive the payment of all or a portion of the wages
they have already earned. If they do so, they are barred from
subsequently recovering according to the terms of the collective
agreement. In the case itself the action was brought by certain
foremen on a farm to recover back pay and to establish their
right to further employment. In March, 1923, under a collective
agreement imposed in conciliation proceedings in 1921, the ten-
hour day was in force in the agricultural industry. The "agree-
ment" also provided that foremen could be discharged only on
November 10 of each year after six months' notice. In the month
named the defendant, in conjunction with other farmers, gave his
foremen notices of discharge, to be effective unless they should ac-
cept a ten and one-half hour day and a new wage scale. The plain-
tiffs felt impelled to accept the new terms of employment. On
June 8, however, they changed their attitude and were summar-
ily discharged. On August 21 a new collective agreement, volun-
tarily entered into, provided for reinstatement of the men, for
the ten-hour day, and for higher wages in return for a renuncia-
tion by the men of their claims arising out of the agreement of
1921 and its violation by the employers. The plaintiffs, however,
refused to renounce their rights. In the action they sought to
recover full wages for the year following June 8, 1923, and to es-
tablish their right to their positions until November 10, 1924, up-
on the theory that their discharge on June 8, 1923, operated mere-
ly as a notice of discharge which could not become effective until
November 10 of the following year. The Reichsgericht ruled
that nothing that occurred prior to the new agreement of August
21, 1923, was effective to alter the term of the plaintiffs' employ-
ment as defined in the agreement of 1921. Accordingly their ac-
tion in June in refusing any longer to work ten and one-half
hours or to accept the substituted scale of wages was entirely
proper and their summary discharge at that time was inopera-
tive. It was in this connection that the Court remarked that al-
though the plaintiffs were not bound by the terms forced upon
them in March, they could not recover additional pay fol' the
period between that time and June 8, since they had waived their
proper wages by accepting payment according to the substituted
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AGREEMENTS IN GERMAN LAW
scale. Inasmuch as the plaintiffs did not sue for such additional
pay, the remark was gratuitous. The Court did not give any
reasons for its view. Nipperdey, who criticises it,C4 remarks
quite justly that he dictum is hardly authority for the future and
that the courts should be warned against following it, since
thereby "the principle of non-departure will ultimately be sur-
rendered."65
Another instance of disregard for the principle of nonde-
parture from the normative terms of collective agreements is
represented by the decision of the Reichsgericht of May 31,
1922.66 The dispute was over the pay of a machinist on a Ger-
man vessel which had been interned in Chile during the Great
War. On the return journey early in 1920 the plaintiff received
advancements upon his wages in Jamaica and at Bermuda, in
English money. By a special telegraphic arrangement the de-
fendant steamship company had agreed to translate these ad-
vances into German money according to the normal rate of ex-
change. It sought in defense of the case to avoid this special
arrangement and to calculate the amount of the advances ac-
cording to the rate of exchange which was current at the time
they were made. It relied upon a clause in a collective agree-
ment, entered into in January, 1919, and applicable to the parties,
which forbade any alteration in the terms of the agreement by
special contract. The Court satisfied itself that the parties to
the collective agreement did not intend to forbid this type of spe-
cial arrangement and so held the defendant bound to employ the
normal rate of exchange in calculating the balance due to the
plaintiff. Obviously the decision was rendered in the interest of
preventing great hardship in an extraordinary situation. The
4 Dersch, Flatow, etc., op. cit. n. 18 above, I, 31-32, II, 70.
*In the remainder of the Court's decision it awarded the wages sued
for until Nov. 10, 1923, measured by the agreement of 1921 until Aug. 21
and by the new agreement thereafter. It refused to regard the plaintiffs
as entitled to recover for the subsequent year, upon the ground that their
action on June 8 in insisting upon the hours and wages to which they were
entitled operated to give effect to the notices of discharge which had been
given them in March and which they had staved off by accepting the
lengthened hours and substituted pay. The decision on this point seems
highly questionable. Nipperdey, who also differs with the Court on points
of interpretation of the agreement of August 21, 1923, criticises it severely.
"104 RGZ. 385.
Washington University Open Scholarship
24 ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
Court was quite right in stretching a point or two in order to
overcome the strict language of the collective agreement, which
was employed without reference to a situation such as that which
later developed.
G. THE USE OF DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
The litigation of collective agreements in German courts is
rendered much easier than it would otherwise be by the system
of declaratory judgments which prevails there, resting upon sec-
tion 256 of the Code of Civil Procedure.6 T If the normative pro-
visions of collective agreements could be enforced only in suits
between parties to individual labor contracts and if the chief
means of holding unions and employers' associations to the obli-
gatory provisions were actions for damages brought after viola-
tions had taken place,6" the number of breaches which went un-
redressed would obviously be considerable. Despite the cheap-
ness and simplicity of the procedure which prevails in the Ger-
man labor courts,69 many workers would fail to sue their employ-
ers and many employers would find it hardly worth while to se-
cure performance of their employees' duties by resorting to court
" See Borchard, The Declaratory Judgment-a Needed Procedural Re-
form, 28 YALE L. J. 1, 105, 1. c. 16-20, 107-109, for an account of the opera-
tion of declaratory judgments in Germany.
The remedy of compelling performance or of enjoining nonperformance
is also available in German law. In fact it is regarded as the primary
remedy in civil cases, with damages a secondary remedy, to be resorted to
where performance is no longer possible. BGB. secs. 249, 251; ZPO. sec.
888. But for some unexplained reason there are no reported cases in
German courts of last resort in which a union or an employers' associa-
tion has been sued for the purpose of actually compelling it to live up to
its obligation under a collective agreement. The closest approach is a
case decided March 21, 1928, by the Reichsarbeitsgericht (RABl. 1928, 206),
in which 21 "key" men in a large plant were enjoined as individuals from
continuing a strike which they had begun without having submitted their
grievance to conciliation as a collective agreement required them to do.
The Court decided the case upon the theory that the defendants were acting
contra bonos mores and therefore were subject to a tort action under BGB.
sec. 826. No reason appears why such a remedy might not be employed
against a union or an employers' association. A decree for specific per-
formance and an injunction differ from a declaratory judgment in that
execution may be had upon them. A declaratory judgment renders the
point in issue res adjudicata, but it cannot be enforced except in another
action brought for that purpose.
I Under the provisions of ArbGG. sec. 9 et seq., sec. 46 et seq.
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action. The inadequacy of damage suits against the organiza-
tions is apparent.
Under the provision of the Code of Civil Procedure cited above,
however, it is possible for anyone who has a legal interest in "the
existence or nonexistence of a legal relation" to bring an action
for a declaration of its existence or nonexistence. As respects
collective agreements the courts have held that both unions and
employers' associations have sufficient legal interest in the exist-
ence or nonexistence of disputed normative provisions of collec-
tive agreements to entitle them to declaratory judgments upon
these provisions even though the members rather than the organ-
izations themselves are the parties directly affected. That a
union or an employers' association is entitled to a declaration re-
garding the existence or nonexistence of an obligatory provision
is obvious.
In two recent cases trade unions have exercised their right to
apply for declaratory judgments. In a decision handed down
January 11, 1928,70 the Reichsarbeitsgericht held that a union's
obligation to further the carrying out of the normative provi-
sions of a collective agreement and its duty to protect the inter-
ests of its members entitled it to a decree respecting the duty of
an employer not to deduct the period of a strike in calculating
the vacations to which his employees were entitled. The alleged
duty rested upon the terms of an imposed agreement. Similarly,
a union of hotel *employees was held to be entitled to apply for a
declaratory judgment against a hotel proprietor, to establish the
right of bell boys, chambermaids, and apprentice waiters to re-
ceive the wages specified in a collective agreement, without re-
gard to tips.7 '
In numerous cases the right of a union or of an employers' as-
sociation to apply for a declaratory judgment has gone unchal-
lenged. Thus in a case in the Reichsarbeitsgericht decided Feb-
ruary 2, 1929,72 an employers' association sought to secure a dec-
laration that an alleged decree of a joint board, establishing low-
er rates of pay, was valid. It was unsuccessful, but its right to
bring the action was not questioned. In the Reichsgericht's de-
-RABL. 1928, 157.
'RABl. 1929, 14 (Sept. 19, 1928).
RABL. 1929, 86.
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cision of June 30, 1925,78 it was a declaratory judgment which
the employers' association sought and obtained.
H. Enforcement by the Parties
Since collective agreements are in effect constitutions for eco-
nomic commonwealths of limited extent, it is natural that the
parties should attempt to provide means of enforcing order
which replace such outside agencies as courts and public con-
ciliation boards, leaving these as a last resort. Within limits the
courts have had no objection to permitting this sort of self gov-
ernment.74  Thus in a recent caser it was held proper for a col-
lective agreement to provide for the shortening of vacations on
account of unexcused absence of workers and for the enforcement
of this provision by the works council although such matters or-
dinarily come within the province of the labor courts.
In 1912 a painter found his shop closed and his employees re-
leased by order of a joint board set up by a collective agreement,
upon the ground that he was underpaying his men.70  He sued
for damages, joining as defendants the national association of
employing painters, the locals of both the employers' association
and the union, and the individual members of the joint board
which had disciplined him. The court held that he had no cause
of action. He had been accorded an opportunity to be heard be-
fore the action was taken and the disciplinary measures had been
withdrawn as soon as he yielded.17
" N. 49 above.
"The self-government which is thus permitted, having its basis in col-
lective agreements, merely replaces in part a self-government, founded
upon statute, which has become traditional in Germany. It was instituted,
with limited participation of the workers, by the Industrial Ordinance. (n.
10 above) and is now carried on under the provisions of the Works Councils
Act (n. 3 above).
15RABI. 1929, 28 (Reichsarbeitsgericht, Nov. 7, 1928).
"81 RGZ. 4 (Nov. 19, 1912).
The law applicable to disciplinary measures authorized by collective
agreement is closely related to that which applies to discipline exerted by
organizations over their members. In the latter field the courts have been
disposed to allow considerable latitude. Thus in a case decided Sep. 22,
1927, and set forth in Dersch, Flatow, etc., op. cit. n. 18 above, II, 132, the
Reichsgeiicht permitted an employers' association to collect a heavy fine
assessed against a member because he had resisted lengthening the hours
of his workers from eight to nine a day. The association had adopted the
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Enforcement of the "closed" shop clause of a collective agree-
ment was refused by the Reichsgericht, however, where the ef-
fect would have been to bar the worker from earning his liveli-
hood.78 The German actors' union had an agreement with an as-
sociation of virtually all the important owners of "legitimate"
theatres in that country and Austria, providing that none but
members of the union should be employed by association mem-
bers. Apparently the union was "open" and did not have un-
reasonably large dues or other onerous membership require-
ments. The plaintiff, an actor, resigned from the union and
brought suit against it and the producers' association to prevent
them from blocking his employment by members of the associa-
tion. The court granted the relief which he sought. A con-
trary holding would have presented the plaintiff with the alter-
native of either rejoining the union or seeking employment in
second-rate theatre or motion picture acting. Such a result, the
court held, would have violated Article 159 of the German Con-
stitution, which reads:
Freedom of association in order to protect and develop
conditions of labor and economic life is guaranteed for
everyone and for all occupations. All agreements and
measures which attempt to limit or impede this freedom
are contrary to law.79
The relation of joint boards established by collective agreement
nine-hour day rule and had imposed the fine in accordance with the pro-
visions of its constitution and by-laws. The Court refused to review the
reasonableness of its action, especially since the member had had ample
opportunity to resign before the nine-hour day went into effect. In 111
RGZ. 199 (July 2, 1925) the court awarded damages to an employers' As-
sociation against a member who -had refused to participate in a lockout
ordered by the association.
"104 RGZ. 327 (Apr. 6, 1922).
"The court also held that to bar the plaintiff from earning his living
would be contra bonos mores. The decision, of course, did not operate to
enable the plaintiff to underbid other actors in applying for work, for the
employers were bound by the wage and other normative provisions of the
agreement. He could, however, continue to reap the benefits of the union's
work without contributing time or money to the union. Apparently the
Reichsgericht had little sympathy with the "closed" shop. Shortly after
the above decision it held several union officials liable in damages to a non-
union worker whose discharge they had procured. RAB. 1923, 338 (Nov.
8, 1922).
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to the labor courts is prescribed in detail in the Labor Courts
Act80 The joint boards may invoke the aid of the labor courts
in obtaining testimony. Their decrees may be enforced by exe-
cution if the judge of a labor court so directs and may be attack-
ed only for lack of jurisdiction, violation of express statutory
provisions, falsification of documents, perjury of witnesses, or
culpable conduct of judge or counsel. The jurisdiction of the
joint boards, however, cannot be made compulsory over employ-
ers and workers to whom a collective agreement is extended by
the Minister of Labor.
I. Protection of Labor Standards Against Unfair Competition
Ordinarily, as has been pointed out, legal enforcement of the
normative provisions of collective agreements is had in actions
upon individual labor contracts or in suits for declaratory judg-
ments brought by unions or employers' associations. But it is
evident in addition that individual workers and employers have
an interest in preventing underbidding by their fellows. If or-
ganizations to protect the standards established by collective
agreement do not exist or do not act effectively, the tort action
for unfair competition remains as a possible means of safeguard-
ing these standards. Thus in a case decided by the Reichsgericht
on April 12, 1927,81 the plaintiff was engaged in the business of
supplying private watchmen for property in Berlin and was
bound by a collective agreement which fixed the wages and work-
ing conditions of the watchmen. The agreement had been de-
clared generally binding by the Minister of labor. The defend-
ant was in the same business and also in the business of furnish-
ing private detectives. He paid his watchmen less than the es-
tablished scale and was advertising effectively for clients, using
his lower charges as bait. In answer to the plaintiff's prayer
for a decree forbidding further unfair competition of this sort,
the defendant maintained that he was not bound by the agree-
ment. He relied upon certain alleged differences between his
services to his clients and those rendered by the plaintiff, to
establish his contention that the decree of the Minister of Labor
did not apply to him. The'Court, however, found that the de-
,o Secs. 91-100.
117 RGZ. 16.
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fendant was rendering substantially the same services as the
plaintiff and was systematically and deliberately seeking to cap-
ture business at the expense of his employees and of his competi-
tors by cutting wages and offering lower rates. The Court held
that he was bound by the extended agreement and that the plain-
tiff was entitled to a decree. Said the Court:
Whoever deliberately and with foresight, in order to be
able to strike at his competitors in this manner, pays his em-
ployees less than the wages which are prescribed in the pub-
lic interest, employs a reprehensible expedient and acts con-
trary to good morals.
Thus it appears that the labor standards which a collective
agreement attempts to maintain may be protected in German
law not only by contract actions but by actions for unfair com-
petition as well. Conceivably such an action might be directed
against an outsider to whom a collective agreement had not been
extended, although its allowance would stretch the precedent es-
tablished in the instant case, if not the broad discretion with
which the statutes endow the courts in determining what is un-
fair competition.82
IV. THE INSISTENCE UPON INDEPENDENT CONTRACTING
ORGANIZATIONS
Although individual freedom of contract and even the freedom
of unions and employers' associations not to contract often dis-
appear almost entirely, as has been shown, from the German
system of control of employment by "agreement," the conception
of contract has made a contribution which has not been sub-
merged and which appears likely to remain of the essence of the
system. That contribution finds expression in the insistence of
the courts upon the doctrine that no organization can become
party to a collective agreement, whether voluntary or imposed in
conciliation proceedings, unless it is in fact an independent asso-
ciation. Its independence is of the essence of its capacity to con-
tract. The courts' conception of the system calls for two interests,
with partly common and partly opposing aims, each endowed
so far as may be with adequate power, dealing with each other
"Act of June 7, 1909 (RGBI, 499) sec. 1; BGB. sec. 826.
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in the effort to establish a basis for co-operation in production.
That, after all, is the essence of the idea of contract, preserved in
the only way in which it can be preserved under modern indus-
trial conditions. However much of regulation from above may
find its way into the system and however fully the worker or the
small employer may at times appear to be lost in a crowd, the in-
dividual is reasonably assured that his interests will be safe-
guarded by an organization which is responsible primarily to him
and to his fellows. He can count for as much in his capacity of
producer as a single individual has a right to expect in the
presence of large aggregates of men and of capital.
The first essential of an organization's capacity to enter into
collective labor agreements is that the making of such agree-
ments be part of its purpose as an organization. That purpose
is to be gathered from its constitution and by-laws and from the
history of its activities. If its purpose be to further the interests
of its members in their employment relations, it is ordinarily re-
garded as capable of entering into collective agreements.,3 The
same qualifications are necessary to the valid imposition of a col-
lective agreement upon an association. There is, however, this
difference: that an organization which advances its members'
interests as employers or workers may by express provision in its
constitution be unable to enter into a voluntary agreement, but it
is doubtful whether it can exempt itself from having an "agree-
ment" imposed upon it.-
The question of capacity to enter into collective agreements has
arisen a number of times with respect to branch unions. It has
been held that they are capable of entering into such agreements
if they negotiate independently with employers and have a rea-
sonable degree of control over their own funds and affairs.8'
Control of a trade union by an employer or a group of employ-
'107 RGZ. 144 (Oct. 1, 1923); 111 RGZ. 354 (Oct. 9, 1925); 115
RGZ. 177 (Oct. 29, 1926); RABI. 1927, 378 (Jul. 6, 1927); and 119 RGZ.
13 (Nov. 18, 1927) are typical cases in which the matter has been decided.
In two of them the question arose with regard to bar associations in their
relation to clerical employees in law offices.
11 See Nipperdey's discussion of this point in Dersch, Flatow, etc., op. cit.
n. 18 above, I, 14 et seq.
'RAB1. 1928, 212 (May 9, 1928) ; RABI. 1927, 363, n. 37 above; 73 RGZ.
92, n. 19 above.
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ers is fatal to its capacity to enter into collective agreements.
Thus the Reichsarbeitsgericht entertained grave doubts as to the
independence of the agricultural workers' union involved in a
recent case.86 It sent the case back to the lower court for further
determination upon the facts. The union was a section of the
Pomeranian Agricultural League and was largely under the con-
trol of the board of directors of the League, which was heavily
weighted with employers. The court laid down three requisites
to an organization's capacity: (1) a membership composed ex-
clusively of employers or of workers; (2) furtherance of the
economic interests of its members as a purpose of the organiza-
tion; and (3) independence of membership and of finance from
control by the opposing labor or employer interest. The ques-
tion, as the Court emphasized again a little later,17 must be de-
cided in each case upon the facts.
A question of considerable difficulty is presented in the case
of a union whose membership is confined to workers in the em-
ploy of a single concern. There it would seem that the employer
has the opportunity of exercising considerable control by means
of his power to discharge. In a recent case involving such a
union "8s the Reichsarbeitsgericht permitted the finding of the low-
er Court, to the effect that the union possessed the requisite in-
dependence, to stand. The union emphasized the conservation
of its methods by abjuring strikes and barring from member-
ship all workers who were members of international organiza-
tions. It was, however, financially independent, and a worker
who was discharged by the employer might apply to the union's
governing body for permission to retain his membership.
At the opposite extreme from these conservative unions stands
the revolutionary union, for which such instruments of compro-
T RABI. 1929, 23 (Sep. 29, 1928). The question arose there, as it now
does fairly frequently, in connection with the provision of ArbGG. Sec.
10 provides that workers' and employers' organizations may become parties
to actions in the labor courts; sec. 11 that members of such organizations
who are parties litigant may be represented by agents of the organizations
to which they belong, designated for the purpose. In applying both sections
the courts have generally taken the position that only such organizations
as have the qualifications for entering into collective agreements have
capacity to become parties or to represent parties before the labor courts.
"RAB. 1929, 25 (Oct. 10, 1928).
"RABl. 1929, 67 (Feb. 9, 1929).
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mise as collective agreements are, at least in theory, anathema.
Again the German court has taken a realistic attitude and has
refused to be frightened by slogans and theoretical objectives.
In a case decided November 10, 1928,89 the union in question had
for its declared purpose the overthrow of the capitalist system.
It contemplated entering into quickly terminable agreements
with a referendum to its membership in each instance. There
was evidence that its leader had once conducted a strike in viola-
tion of an imposed "agreement." There was, however, evidence
also that the union had kept an agreement since 1925. The low-
er court had denied the union's capacity to contract or to appear
for one of its members in court proceedings, upon the ground that
whatever reliability it had displayed was a mere cloak for its real
purposes. These, the court felt, were political in character and
deprived the union of the right to be trusted. The Reichsar-
beitsgericht sent the case back for further consideration, re-
marking that the union's ultimate political purposes were no bar
to its capacity if the evidence showed that in the conduct of its
affairs it conformed reasonably to the existing order.
V. THE SCOPE OF REGULATION BY AGREEMENT
A. Occuptional and Geographical Scope
Obviously there must be some line of demarcation, however
hazy, between the field occupied by collective labor agreements
in Germany and the areas unoccupied or covered by other
agencies of control. The occupational and geographical scope of
each agreement is determined from the agreement itself-that is
to say, from the extent of the membership of the parties if it is a
voluntary agreement, from the decree of the Minister of Labor
if it is an extended agreement, and from the decree making it
obligatory if it has been imposed in conciliation proceedings.
When difficulties of interpretation arise in the course of litigation
the courts necessarily pass upon them. The question has arisen
only with regard to extended agreements.
A decision of the Reichsarbeitsgericht9 o in regard to the mat-
ter was handed down recently in a suit for wages. The plain-
RAB1. 1929, 50.
RABI. 1929, 91 (Feb. 20, 1929).
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tiffs claimed under a collective agreement which had been ex-
tended by the Minister of Labor to the entire metal industry of
Berlin. The agreement applied to the parties to the case, if at
all, only by reason of its extension. The defendant contended
that she was operating a handwork foundry and not an indus-
trial establishment. The Court upheld this contention. A hand-
work establishment, said the Court, ordinarily is one in which
the master works with his men. Here, however, the master was
the widow of the former proprietor. The Court therefore relied
upon other facts in reaching its conclusion. There were no ma-
chines in use in the establishment and only eight or ten men were
employed. The Minister of Labor, the Court felt, did not intend
to impose the agreement upon a shop of this kind.
In another case which arose in a similar manner 91 the plain-
tiffs were printers. They claimed that the extended agreement
in the printing industry applied to them and to their employer
in relation to them. The defendant was a manufacturer of pa-
per bags. On ten per cent. of its product it printed advertising,
and for this purpose the plaintiffs were employed. Many of the
bags were made outside the establishment by convict labor, so
that the plaintiffs formed a fairly large proportion of the em-
ployees hired by the defendant. The Court found, however, that
in view of all the facts, and especially in view of the fact that the
printing work was merely incidental to the primary purpose of
producing paper bags, the printing trades agreement should be
held not to apply.
Necessarily the court has steered a middle course in choosing
between overlapping extensions of craft and industrial agree-
ments. In two cases involving building workers employed by
chemical manufacturers92 a fairly definite guide was furnished
by the Minister of Labor, to which the Reichsarbeitsgericht ad-
hered. The Minister in his decree specified that permanent
buildings trades employees of chemical companies, hired for re-
pair and replacement work, should be governed by the agreement
in the chemical industry, but that builders hired for new con-
struction should have their wages and working conditions fixed
"RABI. 1928, 288 (Sept. 19, 1928).
RABL 1928, 233 (June 13, 1928) ; RABI. 1929, 66 (Dec. 19, 1928).
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by the building trades agreement. In the second of the two cases
the plaintiffs' individual contracts of employment stipulated that
they should be controlled by the agreement in the chemical in-
dustry. The Court, however, held that such a stipulation was
of no effect and sent the case back to the lower court for deter-
nuination upon the facts. The plaintiffs in that case formed a
unit of 200 workers in a total force of 1100.
The Reichsgericht has held, necessarily, that the discretion of
the Minister of Labor and of the conciliators in deciding whether
or not to extend or to impose agreements is not reviewable in
court. The only question, it is said, which a court will consider
if the validity of an imposed agreement is questioned is the ju-
risdiction 93 of the Minister or other official acting in the case.
B. Scope in Relation to Other Forms of Control
Within its occupational and geographical scope, of course, the
control exerted by a collective agreement is not exclusive. The
relations between that control and individual contract have al-
ready been discussed. The possibility of providing for the set-
tlement of disputes by joint boards has also been indicated. It
remains to trace the lines of demarcation between control by
agreement and regulation of employment by the legislature di-
rectly, by works councils, and by guilds.
As regards direct legislative enactment applying to employ-
ment, the doctrine it clear that it cannot be displaced by the pro-
visions of collective agreements. Where there is a conflict the
statutes prevail. In a case decided by the Reichsarbeitsgericht
on October 26, 1927,1" the plaintiff was a discharged store man-
ager. He sued for two months' pay, relying on the provisions of
a statute95 which entitled him to three months' notice of dis-
charge. He had received only slightly over thirty days' notice.
The defendant relied in part upon the provisions of a collective
119 RGZ. 193 (Dec. 2, 1927). Such a formula as that which limits a
court's power of review to the question of jurisdiction is, of course, simply
a cloak for the real problem of determining which points to review and
which to regard as concluded by the administrative action. See the re-
marks of Dersch in Dersch, Flatow, etc., op. cit. n. 18 above, II, 101 et seq.
"RABI. 1927, 560.
"
5 Act of July 9, 1926, RGBI. I, 399.
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agreement which entitled it to discharge the plaintiff with thirty
days' notice. The Court held that the statute prevailed over the
agreement and that the plaintiff was entitled to his pay.
In three cases involving the employees of insurance associa-
tions"6 the Reichsgericht has dealt with the relation beween col-
lective agreements and statutory regulation. The employment
of workers in insurance association offices is regulated by the
National Insurance Ordinance.9 7 With respect to numerous mat-
ters it is laid down in the Ordinance that the terms and condi-
tions of employment shall be prescribed in rules promulgated
by the insurance associations with the approval of the insurance
department of the Government. In each of the three cases an
employee of an insurance association claimed the benefit of a
provision in a collective agreement which was more favorable
to him than the rules laid down by his employer pursuant to the
provisions of the Insurance Ordinance. In the first case the em-
ployee was held to be entitled to the salary fixed by the collective
agreement, for it was held to be the meaning of the Insurance
Ordinance in the matter of classifying employees that the classi-
fications established by the associations' rules should be minima
for salary purposes, leaving it possible for collective agreements
to assign employees to higher grades. In the second case, how-
ever, an employee claimed the right to life tenure in accordance
with a clause in a collective agreement which conferred that right
upon employees of his grade who had served ten years. But a
rule promulgated by the association which employed him was to
the effect that life tenure might be granted by the board of di-
rectors to an employee who had served ten years. The court
held that the rule promulgated under the Ordinance was in effect
a part of statute law and should prevail over the collective agree-
ment. Since the plaintiff had not been granted life tenure by the
board of directors of his association, his contention failed.98 In
"114 RGZ. 22 (May 18, 1926); 114 RGZ. 112 (June 18, 1926); 117
RGZ. 415 (July 6, 1927).
RGBI. 1924, I, '779.
It is doubtful whether a collective agreement can confer a right to a
tenure which extends beyond its own term. It would seem that it can,
subject to a possible deprivation of the right in a subsequent agreement.
See the remarks of Nipperdey in Dersch, Flatow, etc., op. cit. n. 18 above,
II, 49-50.
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the third case an employee sued for the wages he had been prom-
ised, which corresponded to those laid down in a collective
agreement. It was held that he could not recover, since the
salary scale promulgated by his employer, to which statutory
force was given by the Insurance Ordinance, prescribed a lower
rate.
As respects the works councils, there can be no question re-
garding their thorough subordination to the control set up by
collective agreements. The works councils are simply bodies of
workers' representatives, chosen by vote of the employees in each
establishment. By statute these bodies are charged with the
duty of cooperating with the employer in furthering the pur-
poses of the enterprise and with the further duty of safeguard-
ing the interests of the workers. The Work Councils Act 0 pro-
vides in section 8 that "The right of the economic associations of
wage-earning and salaried employees to represent the interests
of their members shall not be affected by the provisions of this
Act." Section 66 (5) provides that the works council in each es-
tablishment shall "come to an agreement with the employer as
regards works rules applicable to all employees and amendments
thereof, subject to the terms of existing collective agreements."
In section 78 (1) it is laid down that the separate councils of
wage-earning and salaried employees shall "see that legal pro-
visions for the benefit of employees, collective agreements,
and . . . decisions . . . are carried out." 00  Thus at
virtually every point where there might be a question of priority
of control between works councils and collective agreements the
statute is explicit that the latter shall prevail. The statute is so
explicit that the matter has not been litigated.10
' N. 3 above.
See RABI. 1928, 265 (Reichsarbeitsgerioht, July 4, 1928) for an ex-
ample of the application of this provision.
'The works councils have been characterized as administrative in char-
acter. The civil and labor courts have no jurisdiction to control their
operation or to enforce the provisions of the Works Councils Act. 107
RGZ. 244 (Sep. 25, 1923). But of course it is possible for the validity of
some act of a works council to be passed upon collaterally in a civil case.
Guillebaud, THE Woas COUNCIL (1928) contains an account of the work-
ing of the system.
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The Industrial Ordinance'0 2 long ago established guilds of pro-
prietors in the "handwork" industries, to which was assigned
the function, among others, of regulating the status of craftsmen
and apprentices. These guilds continue to exist. It has been
held that the statutory establishment of some of them and the
compulsory membership which may be demanded of the pro-
prietor of a shop lo does not impair the freedom of association
which Article 159 of the Constitution guarantees. That free-
dom is protected against pressure from private parties, but there
is held to be no immunity from legislative interference with the
right to associate or to refrain from associating.' 0' The same
administrative decision in which this point was decided concedes
that the arrangements put into effect by a guild must yield to
those established by collective agreement in matters connected
with the employment relation.
Conflict between guild relations and collective agreements, as
evidenced by the cases, has arisen chiefly with regard to appren-
ticeship. The court 05 had first to deal with the contention that
apprenticeship is a matter of education rather than of labor and
hence does not fall within the field which it is competent for col-
lective agreements to govern with binding effect. Historically,
the court conceded, there is much to be said for that view. But
it held that in contemporary society the employer-employee
aspect of apprenticeship is so important that, at least in the
matter of compensation of the apprentice, a collective agreement
may lay down norms which take priority over the compensation
specified in contracts of apprenticeship or in guild regulations.06
C. The Determination of the Limits
The protection of the integrity of control by collective agree-
ment within the limits assigned to it, together with the inter-
'N. 10, above. Sees. 81 & 100.
Sec. 100 of the Ordinance.
'oRABI. 1927, 410 (Hamburg Oberverwaltungsgericht, July 12, 1927).
The nature of Art. 159 thus is quite different from that of American bills
of rights, which confer immunities from governmental but not from private
action of an oppressive character.
'RABI. 1928, 185 (Reichsarbeitsgericht, Mar. 14, 1928).
' RABl. 1928, 277 (Sep. 19, 1928) ; ib. 278 (Sep. 26, 1928) are other de-
cisions of the Reiehsarbeitsgericht to the same effect.
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pretation of the statutes fixing these limits, has been in the hands
of the civil courts and of the labor courts. An example is fur-
nished by a recent decision of the Reichsarbeitsgericht.'7 A
collective agreement established the basic rates of pay in the
Rhine-Westphalia iron and steel industry. The unions having
properly terminated certain sub-agreements, the Minister of
Labor appointed a special conciliator in accordance with the
Conciliation Ordinance who summoned a board of seven repre-
sentatives of each side to sit with him in the matter. On Oc-
tober 26, 1928, the conciliator announced a decree which not only
purported to replace the sub-agreements terminated by the
unions but also attempted to alter the basic rates of pay estab-
lished by the principal agreement. By its terms the latter had
until April 1, 1929, to run. On October 31 the Minister of Labor
declared the decree to be binding upon the industry. The asso-
ciation of iron and steel producers thereupon sued for a declara-
tion that the decree thus imposed was of no effect. The Court
granted the declaration. The conciliation board, it said, had no
power to trench upon the field covered by the existing agree-
ment. The statute under which it acted gave it power to deal
with conflicts of interest between employers and employees, but
there can be legitimate conflicts of interest over matters already
covered by agreement. The sole questions which can arise un-
der agreements are matters of interpretation, and these are for
the courts. The parties to the agreement did not by appearing
in the conciliation proceedings confer upon the board broader
powers than the statute gave it. There was no evidence that the
agreement had been abrogated by consent. The Minister of
Labor could not base a binding decree upon an invalid concilia-
tion decision. The collective agreement, therefore, remained in
force.
Thus it was placed beyond the power of either party as well
as of the Minister of Labor himself to prevent the court from
giving full effect to a collective agreement validly formed. Ap-
parently no power short of the national legislature could invade
the integrity of the control established by agreement.
RABI. 1929, 73 (Jan. 22, 1929).
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VI. AN APPRAISAL OF THE SYSTEM
The American student of modern democratic organization can
hardly avoid allowing a wistful note to creep into his appraisal
of the German system of control of employment by collective
agreement. There is indicated by the system a creative ability
in devising social mechanisms which is decades in advance of
anything that has been developed in the United States. The
theoretical soundness and apparent adaptation to present-day
needs of the structure which has been set up can only arouse ad-
miration. A summary of the leading features of the plan will
indicate why it calls, on the surface, for so favorable a judgment.
Basic in the system is the abandonment of all pretense that the
individual labor contract is a democratic means of establishing
standards of employment. Legal freedom to work or not to
work, to employ or not to employ, remains; but the individual
contract is shunted aside as a determinant of the consequences of
choosing to work or to employ, wherever an adequate substitute
is available. In defining what is an adequate substitute emphasis
is placed upon the democratic principle, which replaces the old
type of freedom of contract, that individual workers and em-
ployers should have a real opportunity, so far as laws can insure
it, to make their force felt in establishing the terms of the em-
ployment relation. That can only be done where they act col-
lectively. Hence every opportunity is afforded them to deal
through organizations of their own devising and to express the
results of their dealing in collective agreements, which are kept
as genuinely free as possible. But a failure of workers' and em-
ployers' organizations to function successfully is not permitted
either to introduce disorder into employment relations or to stop
the process of production and thereby to deprive the community
of needed goods and services. By the extension of existing vol-
untary agreements, backward producers may be brought up to
prevailing standards; and by the imposition of new agreements
through state action strikes and lockouts are in many instances
outlawed. Behind the whole system stand the courts, ready to
apply legal sanctions where obligations are being disregarded, if
their jurisdiction is invoked.
In developing legal equipment with which to handle so novel
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a situation great ingenuity has been manifested in two direc-
tions. Through a combination of legislative and judicial action
a body of substantive law has been worked out which translates
into legal terms the actualities of collective bargaining. This
has been accomplished both by the application of principles of
contract law where these seemed to fit and by a bold departure
from them where they led to inadequate conclusions. Then, more
recently, the act establishing the labor courts'08 has set up a
system of tribunals and provided a procedure which will go far
in preventing too rigid and unrealistic an application of legal
rules to the system of collective agreements. From the courts
of first instance up to the Reichsarbeitsgericht itself employer
and employee representatives sit in judgment alongside of ju-
rists, making use in the lower courts of a simple, inexpensive pro-
cedure and in the higher courts of an appellate procedure which
is as careful as that of the regular civil courts. 00
As respects the legal doctrines which have been applied in
the collective agreement cases, the separation of the terms of
IN. 11 above.
The judicial members of the labor courts must possess the qualifica-
tions of judges of the ordinary courts and, in addition, must be versed in
labor matters. The employer and employee associates are chosen for limit-
ed sittings from panels nominated by the interests from which they come.
Each chamber of each district and state court is composed of a presidingjudicial member and of one labor and one employer associate. Each
chamber of the Reichsarbeitsgericht has three judicial members and one
labor and one employer associate. A judicial member presides in each
court. In the district labor courts lawyers are barred and the presiding
judge, who handles the preliminary proceedings alone, is directed to pro-
ceed at first as a mediator if no previous mediation or conciliation pro-
ceedings have been had in the case. In the state labor courts, to which the
first appeal is taken in cases of importance, the cause is handled largely
like an ordinary civil case, and this is true also in the Reichsarbeitsgericht.
Lawyers or agents of unions and employers' associations may appear for
the parties in the state labor courts, while in the Reichsarbeitsgericht the
parties must be represented by lawyers. It seems quite likely that a
similar combination of the specialist's experience in particular matters
with the lawyer's familiarity with the wisdom of the past will be employed
in many countries in rendering the entire system of courts able to cope with
the demands of the Great Society. Indications of the tendency may be seen
in juvenile courts and in various administrative tribunals. Perhaps
nowhere else has a substitute for ordinary judicial action been as con-
sciously developed, with as much regard for all the values involved, as in
the case of the German labor courts.
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these agreements into normative and obligatory provisions was
a master stroke upon which the usefulness and symmetry of the
whole structure of collective agreement law depend. Only one
adverse criticism seems called for in this connection. Either
the legislature or the courts should make it an implied term of
every agreement that the officials and perhaps also the members
of the associations which are parties to the agreement are under
a personal duty not to engage in concerted activities to force a
change in the terms of the agreement. Such a duty, of course,
would be obligatory and yet would be imposed in the same
quasi-legislative fashion as the normative provisions. Theoret-
ical objections can be made to it, but these do not seem to be suf-
ficiently weighty to overcome the desirability of compelling not
only the associations but also individuals to keep the peace. In
view of the attitude of the German courts in labor cases gener-
ally, it does not seem likely that this power over individuals
would be used in an oppressive manner.
One other major criticism involves the courts' insistence upon
the "open" shop. If the labor organizations are to be charged
with the responsibility of creating and maintaining a just and
permanent system of employment relations, it would seem that
they are entitled to the financial support of all the workers whom
they benefit. Minor abuses of their power over members could
be corrected by appeals to the courts. Major abuses could only
result in the unions' being supplanted by some other agency. It
should be noted, on the other hand, that there are three compet-
ing groups of unions in Germany,110 which exist side by side in
some of the larger industries. There would have to be a safe-
guard against the more powerful of these making use of legal
machinery to crowd the others from the field."'
I The "free" or socialist unions, the Christian unions, and the Hirsch-
Duncker unions. The former have by far the largest membership.
I A number of lesser criticisms of judicial decisions have been made
earlier in this article. See the text based upon cases cited in nn. 55 & 63
above. An additional decision which seems regrettable should be recorded.
In 103 RGZ. 23 (Sep. 30, 1921) it was held that a decree of the Minister of
Labor extending a collective agreement operated to supersede an earlier
agreement, calling for lower rates of pay, between the same union and an
employer who was not a party to the second agreement. It ought not be
possible for an administrative act, which a union in a sense obtains, to
obliterate an earlier pledge of faith by the union.
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Even from a theoretical standpoint it must be admitted that
skepticism as to the power of a court actually to enforce its de-
crees against a determined group of workers or employers is in-
evitable and quite justifiable. As to the German law of collec-
tive agreements that skepticism is reinforced by the decision of
the Reichsgericht in a case which already has been discussed in
another connection, 112 whereby the value of the damage suit as
a remedy was considerably diminished. The defendant union
was held liable on account of having conducted a strike in viola-
tion of a collective agreement. But the case was sent back to
the lower court so that the amount of the damages might be
determined. This amount, the Court said, should be diminished if
it were found, as the facts indicated, that the workers, who began
the strike without the authorization of the union, would have
continued it in spite of all that the union might have done to
cause them to desist. The case, it appears, ultimately was set-
tled out of court.113
The reaction of the theorist to the German system of collective
agreements, however, whether it be that of the advocate of in-
dustrial democracy or that of the skeptic, is not the criterion by
which the system is actually going to be judged. The final test
will be whether the system extends itself as a result of the
satisfaction it gives or whether it yields place to some com-
peting method of controlling the employment relation. The data
available to the writer are not adequate for the formation of a
conclusion upon this point. Collective agreements, as has been
noted, became dominant during the immediate post-war period.
There was a rapid growth in number of establishments and
number of workers covered by such agreements, which reached
its peak in 1922. Immediately afterward there was a sharp
drop incident to the economic crisis of 1923-1924. From 1925 to
January 1, 1927, the last date for which published figures are
available, there was a further slight decline in the number of
workers governed by collective agreements, but there was at the
same time an increase in the number of establishments to which
these agreements applied. On the latter date more than 65 per
' 111 RGZ. 105, n. 35 above.
SDersch, Flatow, etc., op. cit. n. 18 above, I, 63.
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cent. of the male and 63.7 per cent. of the female hand and ma-
chine workers, together with 50 per cent. of the male and 41.7
per cent. of the female salaried employees engaged in German ag-
riculture, trade, and industry came under the control of existing
collective agreements. 114
Figures are not available to show what proportion of these
workers came under true, or voluntary, agreements and what
proportion under agreements which had been extended to them
or imposed by official action. In 1925, however, when nearly
12,000,000 workers were subject to collective agreements, there
were just under 5,000,000 workers in the three leading groups
of trade unions,115 indicating that perhaps more than half of the
workers to whom collective agreements applied were subject to
them only because the power of the state has been invoked to ex-
tend the agreements made by the unions. Of the latter, also, an
undetermined number must have been imposed in conciliation
proceedings. If definite figures were available, it would still be
U'SONDERHEFT 43 to RABI., DiE TARIFVERTRAEGE Im DEUTSCHEN REICHE
AM 1 JANUAR, 1927, p. 7. The percentage of the total number of workers
and employees coming under collective agreements according to these fig-
ures was 61.3. Actually the percentage was probably more nearly 69, if
correction is made to allow for a shrinkage in the number of persons em-
ployed on Jan. 1, 1927, as compared with the summer of 1925 when the
census of employed persons, used in calculating the percentages in the text,
was taken. The following table, taken from p. 4 of the same study, gives
the figures upon the scope of collective agreements year by year:
No. of No. of No. of
Date Agreements Establishments Workers
End of 1912 10,739 159,930 1,574,285
1 " 1913 10,885 143,088 1,398,597
" " 1914 10,840 143,650 1,395,723
1915 10,171 121,697 943,442
" " 1916 9,435 104,179 740,074
" " 1917 8,854 91,313 905,670
" " 1918 7,819 107,503 1,127,690
" " 1919 11,009 272,251 5,986,475
" 1920 11,624 434,504 9,561,323
" 1921 11,488 697,476 12,882,874
.. .. 1922 10,768 890,237 14,261,106
Jan. 1, 1924* 8,790 812,671 13,135,384
" " 1925 7,099 785,945 11,904,159
" 1926 7,533 788,755 11,140,521
" " 1927 7,490 807,300 10,970,120
*Figures for this year are estimates.
' See n. 109 above.
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doubtful how many of the agreements which appeared to be vol-
untary actually were so, for it might well be that many such
agreements were reached only because of the threat of official
action as the probable alternative. On the other hand, if the
trade unions were not reinforced by official extensions of the
agreements they made, it is possible that more workers would
feel impelled to contribute to their support by becoming mem-
bers.
It is probable that the decline in the number of workers from
1925 to 1927, which the figures show, was brought about by the
great decline in employment that occurred during these years.
The number of unemployed recorded at the employment ex-
changes increased from 400,000 in the summer of 1925 to 2,440,-
000 on January 1, 1927.216 To a considerable extent this unem-
ployment, like that which has developed in the United States, ap-
pears to have been "technological," that is, incident to the elimi-
nation of workers by machines and by the use of more efficient
methods in industry.117 The fact that the number of workers per
establishment decreased in establishments covered by collective
agreements lends color to the theory that the decline in the total
number of workers controlled by agreements can be accounted
for in this way."8 The heaviest decline in number of workers
occurred in the metal, textile, chemical, musical instruments and
toy, wood-working, and clothing industries, with the metal in-
dustries far outweighing all the others in importance. There
were partially offsetting increases in agriculture, forestry, min-
ing and building.
Perhaps the greatest single danger to the system of collective
agreements in Germany lies in the possibility that powerful em-
ployers may attempt to set up company unions in opposition to
the trade unions. Democracy is still regarded as an experiment
" Op. cit. n. 113 above, p. 7.
" This process goes by the name of rationalization in Europe. Because
of Germany's international position it is being pursued assiduously in that
country and the unions have agreed to its necessity, at the same time em-
phasizing the need of protecting the workers. For an optimistic discussion
of the ultimate effects of rationalization see Henri Fuss, Rationalization
and Unemployment (1928) 17 INTERNATIONAL LABoR REV. 802.
' Although rationalization is supposed to result in closing inefficient es-
tablishments as well as in throwing workers out of enployment.
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in politics and it is more certainly an experiment in the economic
sphere. It may be that relatively enlightened employers who
know how to keep labor satisfied will triumph over organizations
controlled by the workers themselves, as thus far they have suc-
ceeded in doing in the United States. In Germany such employ-
ers have but to capture the works councils, whose expenses they
are already required by statute"19 to bear. Incentive to do so
may come from the increasing pressure of foreign competition
and the consequent necessity of pushing "rationalization" to the
limit. Willingness on the part of the employees to have them do
so may come from the greater ease of life which results from
having someone else take care of ordering one's affairs, as well
as from fear of economic pressure. Beyond engaging in the
election of the councillors, there seems to be no necessity for the
ordinary worker to concern himself with the operation of the
works councils system unless a meeting of some sort is called
by the councillors themselves. .Although, as has been indicated,
the councils are completely bound to uphold existing collective
agreements, there is nothing in the law to prevent them from in-
stituting methods of dealing with employers which in time can
replace such agreements. 20  The councils cannot enter into leg-
ally enforcible contracts, but they can make arrangements and
agree upon rules with employers, and they can appeal to and be
brought before the agencies of conciliation which are established
by statute.12 '
Two factors in the German situation as it has developed, on the
other hand, are likely to operate to defeat any attempt on the
part of employersto supplant the system of collective agreements.
I BRG. sec. 36.
Although BRG. sec. 78 (2) requires that where the workers represented
by a works council are members of unions the latter shall be permitted tojoin in negotiations over wages and working conditions.
' The wording of sec. 6 of the Conciliation Ordinance allows a conciliation
decree to be made binding even when a works council represents the work-
ers. Under BRG. sec. 75 certain of such decrees relating to conditions of
work become binding automatically. But this binding effect is not deemed
to be of the same character as that which attaches to the normative por-
tion of collective agreements. It cannot be given effect in civil suits in-
volving individual labor contracts but must be enforced by whatever
statutory penalties may be provided. See the discussion of Dersch in
Dersch, Flatow, etc., op. cit. n. 18 above, I, 143-148, 155-157.
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The first is the fact that to a considerable extent the trade unions
have succeeded in annexing the works councils by securing the
election of their candidates as members and by exercising control
over these members after they are elected. 122 The second is the
fact that the trade union leadership is experienced and reliable
and forms both the most powerful single defense against the con-
tinuing efforts of communists and syndicalists to capture the
works councils, and the greatest guaranty of the stability of the
present system of controlling employment. That guaranty would
not be present in a system of works agreements. 123
Thus it can be seen that the future of collective agreements in
Germany lies in the lap of the gods. In any plan that may be de-
veloped there or in any other country, however, it is likely that
some of the elements of the present system will be found neces-
sary to successful operation. To correlate those elements with
valuable features that may be discovered elsewhere is a task with
broader confines than the limits of the present article.
I BRG. sec. 31 provides that trade union representatives shall be invited
to sit with a works council upon the request of one-fourth of the members
of the council.
I See Guillebaud, op. cit. n. 100 above, pp. 41-75, for an account of the
relation of the works councils to the trade union movement and to col-
lective agreements.
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